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An Investigation into the Positive Effect of an Educated Wife 
on Her Husband’s Earnings: The Case of Japan in the Period 
between 2000 and 2003. 
 
Abstract 
     We analyze the effect of a wife’s human capital on her husband’s earnings, using 
individual-level data for Japan in the period 2000–2003.  We find a positive 
association between a wife’s education and her husband’s earnings, which can be 
attributed to the assortative mating effect as well as the positive effect of an educated 
wife on her husband’s productivity.  We divide the sample into those couples with 
non-working wives and those with working wives, and also employ an estimation 
strategy proposed by Jepsen (2005), attempting to control for the assortative mating 
effect.  Our regression analysis provides suggestive evidence that educated wives 
increase their husbands’ productivity and earnings only when they are non-workers and 
have sufficient time to support their husbands.  (120 words) 
 
Key Words: earnings, human capital, marriage, the family, assortative mating, 
cross-productivity effect within marriage. 
JEL classification: D13, J22, J24, J31 
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Introduction 
 
It is widely recognized that human capital is accumulated through costly investment, 
such as formal education and working experience (Becker 1964).  Human capital is 
also highly influenced by interaction with surrounding people through sophisticated 
conversations and the like, and thus economic outcomes such as one’s earnings are 
often associated with family and community backgrounds (e.g., Behrman and Wolf 
1984; Boulier and Rosenzweig 1984; Hauser and Sewell 1986; Corcoran et al. , 1990, 
1992).
1
  Specifically, Benham (1974) was the first to argue that an educated wife 
improves her husband’s productivity and thus increases his earnings; the so-called 
“cross-productivity effect within marriage.”2  Using United States census data from 
1960 to 2000, Jepsen (2005) finds that a wife’s education is positively associated with 
her husband’s earnings, but the magnitude of the effect declines over time.3  Jepsen 
conjectured that the rapid increase in a wife’s labor participation reduced her time to 
improve husband’s productivity, but no direct evidence was provided.  Loh (1996) and 
Gray (1997) find that a wife’s labor participation is negatively associated with her 
                                                   
1 As an example of social learning, Yamamura (2008) reports a case study from Japan in which 
people learned how to use computers from neighbors that already owned one. 
2 Their parents’ schooling is also found to be positively associated with his earnings (e.g., Heckman 
and Holtz 1986; Lam and Shoeni, 1993, 1994). 
3 It is widely observed that a wife’s human capital positively influences a husband’s earnings; for 
instance, in Israel (Neuman and Ziderman 1992), Iran (Scully 1979), the Philippines (Boulier and 
Rosenzweig 1984), Malaysia (Amin and Jepsen, L., 2005), and Brazil (Lam and Shoeni, 1993, 1994; 
Tiefenthaler, 1997). 
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husband’s earnings, but they do not pay direct attention to the wife’s educational level.  
Therefore, little is known about how much a wife’s labor participation reduces the 
positive effect of her education on her husband’s productivity and earnings.    
This paper uses individual level data from Japan from 2000 to 2003 to examine 
whether and how much a wife’s labor participation influences the effect of her 
education on her husband’s productivity and earnings.  We found that an educated wife 
improves her husband’s productivity and earnings only when she is a non-working wife 
and has sufficient time to support her husband.   
 
 
Empirical strategy 
 
This paper uses Japanese General Social Survey (hereafter, JGSS) data.
4
  JGSSs 
adopt a two-step stratified sampling method and were conducted throughout Japan 
between 2000 and 2003.  The surveys included standard questions about an 
individual’s and his/her family characteristics through face-to-face interviews.  These 
data cover information related to marital and demographic (age and gender) status, 
annual income, years of schooling, age, and size of residential area.  Spouses’ 
demographics (age and gender) status, job categories, and years of schooling were also 
obtained.   
Table 1 presents the definitions of the variables we use below and their mean 
                                                   
4 Data for this secondary analysis, "Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS), Ichiro Tanioka," were 
provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center for Social Science Research 
on Japan, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo. 
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values.  All the observations in our sample (n=5,200) were of married couples.  The 
sample was divided into two groups by the wife’s labor participation status; working in 
one group and not working in the other group.  There was no statistical difference in 
the mean values of any observed characteristics between the two groups.  A husband’s 
annual income (INCOMH) in the working-wife group (around 5.6 million yen) was 
almost the same as that of the non-working-wife group
5
.  On average, husbands were 
50 years old and had 13 years of schooling.  Wives were around 47 years old and had 
12 years of education.   
From Table 2, we can see that not only EDUH (husband’s years of schooling) but 
also EDUW (wife’s years of schooling) is positively correlated with INCOMH, which is 
consistent with the cross-productivity effect within marriage (Benham 1974).  We also 
find that the correlation between EDUH and EDUW is 0.65, and that between AGEH 
(husband’s age) and AGEW (wife’s age) is 0.95, suggesting that people tend to marry 
partners of a similar age and educational level.  This finding is congruent to the 
assortative mating in education and age (Becker 1975).  That is, productive males tend 
to marry well educated females, leading to a wife’s education being positively 
associated with her husband’s earnings.   
     In line with Benham (1974) and Jepsen (2005), the regression model takes the 
following form: 
 
ln(INCOMH) i= 0 + 1EDUHi + 2EDUHi  + 3AGEHi + 4AGEWi + Zi β + ui , 
 
                                                   
5 It is possible that a husband's earnings are more appropriate than income in this 
context. However, for this paper, a husband's income is not used, as this data was not 
available. 
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where subscript i denotes married couple i, and the logarithm of INCOMHi is the 
dependent variable.  Regression parameter ’s are to be estimated, and ui is the error 
term.  Since the data on years of work experience is not available, husband’s age is 
incorporated to capture his work experience.  In addition, to control for general market 
conditions and macro-level shocks, large city and medium size city dummies (size of 
residential area) and year dummies are incorporated in Z, the vector of control variables, 
with β as the vector of corresponding coefficients.  
Our major focus in this paper is to find out whether the cross-productivity effect 
is at work; that is, whether an educated wife improves her husband’s productivity and 
earnings (see, e.g., Benham, 1974; Scully, 1979; Kenny, 1983; Wong, 1986; Lam and 
Schoeni, 1993; Lefgren and McIntyre, 2006; Huang et al., 2009).  If an educated 
non-working wife spends a certain amount of time to support her husband and 
consequently raises her husband’s productivity whereas a working wife does not have 
enough time to do so, the coefficient on EDUW is expected to take a positive sign only 
in a sub-sample of couples with non-working wives but not in a sub-sample of couples 
with working wives.  The assortative mating hypothesis, however, also predicts a 
positive association between a wife’s human capital and her husband’s earnings, 
regardless of the wife’s labor participation status (Welch, 1974; Liu and Zhang, 1999; 
Lefgren and McIntyre, 2006; Huang et al., 2009).  We are concerned that this 
assortative mating effect could be sufficiently strong, and the cross-productivity effect 
might be masked and our hypothesis testing may not work.   
In order to alleviate this identification problem between the cross-productivity 
effect within marriage and the assortative mating effect, we will make our best effort to 
control for the assortative mating effect.  Including husband’s own education as a 
 6 
covariate in the regression function is considered as a good way to at least partially 
control for the mating effect (Huang et al., 2009).  Furthermore, Jepsen (2005) 
proposes controlling for the assortative mating effect by using a sub-sample containing 
only husbands and wives who have an age difference of more than 5 years, while she 
claims that “this sample represents couples who are less likely to have met each other 
either in high school or college” (Jepsen 2005, p.204).6 By minimizing the assortative 
mating effect, this estimation strategy helps to isolate the cross-productivity effect.  As 
a result, it is expected that a sub-sample of couples with non-working wives will exhibit 
a significantly positive coefficient on EDUW that is not present in a sub-sample of 
couples with working wives.
7
  Such an estimation result would imply that it takes a 
certain amount of time of an educated wife for her human capital to improve her 
husband’s productivity and earnings.  By contrast, a working wife does not have 
sufficient time to do so, and this newly-discovered foregone increase in husband’s 
earnings should be considered as an additional component of opportunity cost to a 
working wife, though it has never been explicitly taken into account in the existing 
literature.     
 
 
Estimation results 
                                                   
6 Admittedly, this argument is not entirely convincing, as one does not have to meet in school to 
mate assortatively. 
7  Precisely speaking, the decision making process of a wife’s labor participation should be 
considered to control for self-selection. This is, however, beyond the scope of this note and is an 
issue to be addressed in a future study. 
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Table 3 presents our estimation results.  The results in Columns (1)-(3) are based 
on the original sample of married couples, whereas the results in columns (4)-(6) are of 
the sample that excludes couples with an age difference of less than 5 years.  The 
results using the sample of non-working wives are in columns (2) and (5), while the 
results using the sample of working wives are in columns (3) and (6).  As shown in the 
first row, the coefficient on EDUH takes a positive sign with 1% statistical significance 
in all estimations, consistent with the standard theory of human capital.   In Columns 
(1) to (3) the estimated coefficient on EDUW is positive and statistically significant; its 
magnitude indicates that an additional year of a wife’s education increases her 
husband’s annual earnings by 4 to 6 percentage points, which is slightly below the effect 
of a husband’s education but economically significant.  This estimation result that the 
coefficient on EDUW is significantly positive irrespective of the wife’s labor 
participation status implies the assortative mating.  When this assortative mating effect 
is controlled for (Columns 4 to 6), the coefficient on EDUW still remains significantly 
positive in the sub-sample of the non-working wives (Column 5), whereas the 
coefficient on EDUW becomes insignificant in the sub-sample of the working wives 
(Column 6).  This estimation result suggests that an educated non-working wife 
supports her husband and raises his productivity, whereas a working wife does not have 
sufficient time to support her husband as much.  In other words, the cross-productivity 
effect works only when the wife devotes sufficient time to support her husband.   
 One would expect that age, acting as a proxy for experience, would have a 
positive effect on income.  However, as shown in AGEH in Table 3, it has a negative 
effect, significantly so in two cases. I interpret this result as suggesting that the 
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relationship between a husband’s age and his income is non-linear. For the purpose of 
examining this, in addition to AGEH and AGEW, I also incorporate their squares, 
AGEH
2
 and AGEW
2
, as independent variables. The results of the alternative 
specification are in Table 4. Furthermore, AGEH and AGEH
2
 take positive and negative 
signs, respectively, and show statistical significance in all estimations. It follows from 
this that a husband's income increases with his age up to a certain level, but then 
decreases thereafter. Hence, the relationship between a husband’s age and his income is 
considered non-linear. In respect to the main variables in Table 4, the results of EDUH 
and EDUW do not change in the alternative specification. 
    
 
Conclusion 
 
  Jepsen (2005) finds that, using data from 1960 to 2000 in the United States, an 
educated non-working wife increases her husband’s earnings, but this effect declined 
over time, and she conjectures that this is likely due to the secular increase in labor 
participation by married women.   
The current paper directly examined whether and how much a wife’s labor 
participation changes the effect of her education on her husband’s earnings, using 
individual-level data from Japan.  We found that a wife’s human capital has a positive 
association with her husband’s earnings, for both working and non-working wives.  
After restricting the sample to married couples with an age difference greater than 5 
years to partly control for the assortative mating effect, however, the positive effect of a 
wife’s education continues to be observed only in the sub-sample of non-working wives 
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whereas the effect becomes insignificant in the sub-sample of working wives.   
Our statistical analysis, therefore, provides the suggestive evidence for both the 
assortative mating effect and the cross-productivity effect within marriage.  Moreover, 
the cross-productivity mechanism is time-consuming, as Jepsen (2005) rightly 
conjectured.  To our best knowledge, this has a new and important implication in 
considering the labor participation of married women, since the existing literature has 
not explicitly taken into account this cross-productivity effect within marriage as one 
component of the opportunity cost to working women.  
 10 
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Table1. Variable definitions and means. 
Variables Definition Non-working wife  Working wife  All 
INCOMH Husband’s annual income (in ten thousand yen) 565 561 563 
EDUH Husband’s years of schooling 12.9 12.7 12.8 
EDUW Wife’s years of schooling 12.2 12.3 12.3 
AGEH Husband’s age 49.5 49.6 49.5 
AGEW Wife’s age 46.7 47.0 46.9 
Obs.  2283 2659 5200 
Notes: Values are simple averages of yearly values over the period 2000-2003. The total sample of “non-working wife” and “working 
wife” is 4942, which is smaller than the “all” sample, 5200. Observations without data about a wife’s work status lead to this difference. 
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Table2. Correlation matrix. 
Variables INCOMH EDUH EDUW AGEH AGEW 
INCOMH 1 --- --- --- --- 
EDUH 0.35*** 
(0.00) 
1 --- --- --- 
EDUW 0.31*** 
(0.00) 
0.65*** 
(0.00) 
1 --- --- 
AGEH -0.05*** 
(0.00) 
-0.31*** 
(0.00) 
-0.39*** 
(0.00) 
1 --- 
AGEW -0.06*** 
(0.00) 
-0.31*** 
(0.00) 
-0.40*** 
(0.00) 
0.95*** 
(0.00) 
1 
Note:  As the correlation matrix is symmetric, --- indicates the omitted elements to 
avoid redundancies. Numbers in parentheses are p-statistics. *** indicates statistical 
significance at the 1 per cent level. 
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Table. 3.  Regression results on husband’s annual income. 
Variables       All currently married.  Difference in age between husband and 
wife > 5 years. 
    (1) 
All 
    (2) 
Non-worker 
wife  
   (3) 
Worker wife  
 (4) 
All 
    (5) 
Non-worker 
wife  
   (6) 
Worker wife 
EDUH 
 
0.06*** 
(13.9) 
0.08*** 
(12.2) 
0.04*** 
(7.12) 
 0.07*** 
(6.90) 
0.07*** 
(4.66) 
0.07*** 
(4.53) 
EDUW 
 
0.05*** 
(8.57) 
0.06*** 
(6.70) 
0.04*** 
(5.38)  
 0.05*** 
(3.01) 
0.07*** 
(3.31) 
0.02 
(1.11) 
AGEH 
 
-0.002 
(-0.85) 
-0.002 
(-0.64) 
-0.002 
(-0.79) 
 -0.008* 
(-1.70) 
-0.01** 
(-2.01) 
-0.005 
(-0.85) 
AGEW 
 
-0.003 
(-1.15) 
-0.003 
(-0.91) 
-0.001 
(-0.36) 
 -0.005 
(-1.19) 
0.002 
(0.35) 
-0.007 
(-1.16) 
Constant 
 
4.97*** 
(50.1) 
4.68*** 
(34.6) 
5.19*** 
(34.3) 
 5.34*** 
(20.7) 
5.16*** 
(14.3) 
5.56*** 
(13.8) 
Obs. 5200 2283 2659  901 389 473 
Adj R
2
 0.16 0.24 0.10  0.21 0.28 0.14 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the logarithm of the husband’s annual income.  
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics obtained by robust standard errors. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively.  
Although not reported here, large and medium-sized city, and year dummies are also 
controlled for.  
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Table 4.  Regression results on husband’s annual income. 
Variables       All currently married.  Difference in age between husband and 
wife > 5 years. 
    (1) 
All 
    (2) 
Non-worker 
wife  
   (3) 
Worker wife  
 (4) 
All 
    (5) 
Non-worker 
wife  
   (6) 
Worker wife 
EDUH 
 
0.05*** 
(12.1) 
0.06*** 
(10.3) 
0.04*** 
(6.17) 
 0.06*** 
(6.65) 
0.07*** 
(4.44) 
0.07*** 
(4.29) 
EDUW 
 
0.04*** 
(6.08) 
0.04*** 
(4.42) 
0.04*** 
(4.31)  
 0.04*** 
(2.59) 
0.06*** 
(2.86) 
0.01 
(0.81) 
AGEH 
 
0.11*** 
(10.1) 
0.09*** 
(5.62) 
0.12*** 
(8.34) 
 0.12*** 
(6.23) 
0.08** 
(2.20) 
0.15*** 
(5.33) 
AGEH
2
 
 
-0.001*** 
(-10.4) 
-0.001*** 
(-5.46) 
-0.001*** 
(-8.56) 
 -0.001*** 
(-6.54) 
-0.001** 
(-2.40) 
-0.001*** 
(-5.44) 
AGEW 
 
0.02** 
(2.05) 
0.05*** 
(3.14) 
0.008 
(0.52) 
 0.003 
(0.21) 
0.03 
(1.15) 
-0.02 
(-1.07) 
AGEW
2
 
 
-0.0002 
(-1.64) 
-0.0005*** 
(-2.68) 
-0.00004 
(-0.27) 
 -0.00001 
(-0.09) 
-0.0003 
(-0.77) 
0.000 
(1.17) 
Constant 
 
2.11*** 
(15.7) 
1.83*** 
(10.1) 
2.19*** 
(9.85) 
 2.03*** 
(4.71) 
2.02*** 
(2.98) 
2.05*** 
(3.09) 
Obs. 5200 2283 2659  901 389 473 
Adj R
2
 0.29 0.38 0.22  0.29 0.36 0.21 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the logarithm of the husband’s annual 
income.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics obtained by robust standard errors. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, 
respectively.  Although not reported here, large and medium-sized city, and year 
dummies are also controlled for.  
 
